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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 23, 2000, an eagerly anticipated joint trial, dubbed "the media
trial," began at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR or Tribunal), in Arusha, Tanzania.' One of the accused, Jean Bosco
Barayagwiza, a former high-ranking Rwandan government official and a
founding member of the hate-radio, Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM), along with Ferdinand Nahimana, the ex-director of the RTLM, and
Hassan Ngeze, ex-editor of the infamous Kangura newspaper were scheduled
to appear in court. As he made his opening statement, the prosecuting attorney
compared these alleged genocidaires to Nazi propagandist Heinrich Himmler.
However, Barayagwiza (the accused) was absent from court.2 He had issued a
statement, "refusing to associate himself with a show trial" in which he claimed
the proceedings were inherently unfair because "the ICTR was manipulated by
the current Rwandan government and the judges and the prosecutors were the
* B.S., James Madison University, 1989, J.D., Howard University School of Law, 1997. The
author is a former ICTR Associate Legal Director.
1. The trial began after several delays and postponements, the last of which was on September 18,
2000.
2. Hassan Ngeze was also sitting outside the courtroom, in protest of the incomplete translation
of his newspaper's articles, to be used as evidence against him and other discovery issues.
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hostage[s] of Kigali.",3 More recently he has demanded political prisoner status
from the International Committee of the Red Cross.4
Barayagwiza is not the first accused to claim ICTR proceedings are
"unfair." He has, however, come closest to avoid having to answer charges
made against him by the Tribunal's Prosecutor. On November 3, 1999, the
ICTR Appeals Chamber dismissed the indictment against him, "with prejudice,"
and ordered his immediate release (November decision) because it found that
Barayagwiza's procedural rights had been repeatedly violated.5 Shortly
thereafter, the Rwandan government threatened to completely sever relations
with the ICTR. The Tribunal's fear of the Rwandan threats becoming a reality
was in all likelihood, partly the reason for its poorly reasoned, but properly
concluded, reversal of the November decision, on March 4, 2000 "March
decision."6
In this essay I will discuss how the Tribunal and other actors created a
situation where an alleged architect of the 1994 Rwandan genocide was almost
released without a trial on the merits and how such a scenario may possibly be
avoided in the future. In section II, I will examine how this particular accused
person's case took some four and one half years to come to trial. I will then
briefly outline the logical gaps in the November and March decisions and the
effects of the controversy on the credibility of the international justice in section
III. As a supporter of the Tribunal, I will conclude by offering a few
recommendations on how to avoid such a potentially disastrous situation in the
future, in section IV.
11. FROM RWANDA TO ARUSHA: BARAYAGWIZA'S JOURNEY TO A TRIAL ON
THE MERITS
After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza fled to the
Republic of Cameroon. According to the findings of the ICTR Appeals
Chamber,' the Accused and approximately a dozen other Rwandans, including
Nahimana, were arrested in that country on April 15, 1996. It was unclear
whether the Cameroonian authorities made this arrest based on a request from
the Tribunal's Prosecutor or international warrants emanating from Rwandan
3. Foundation Hirondelle, Rwandan Media Suspects Boycott Start of Their Trial, Hirondelle News
Agency (2000), available at http://www.hirondelle.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2000).
4. Foundation Hirondelle, Barayagwiza Demands Political Prisoner Status, Hirondelle News
Agency (2000), available at http://www.hirondelle.org (last visited Nov. 7, 2000).
5. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, No. ICTR-97-19 AR72 (Nov. 3, 1999), available
at http://www.ictr.orgIENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisionsldcs991103.htim. [hereinafter November
Decision].
6. Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, No. ICTR-97-19 (Mar. 31, 2000), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisionsdcs991103. htm. [hereinafter March Decision].
7. Supra note 5, at app. A, (chronology of events).
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and Belgian authorities. Nevertheless, the ICTR's Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) requested that the Accused be provisionally detained under Rule 40
(Provisional Measures) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE)8
only two days later. On May 6, 1996 the Prosecutor sought a three-week
extension for the detention of the Accused in Cameroon and ten days later he 9
sought the transfer of four of the Rwandans detained by Cameroon, excluding
Barayagwiza. At the end of May 1996, the Court of Appeals in Cameroon
issued a decision to adjourn without consideration of the Rwandan
government's extradition request based on the pleadings of the Cameroonian
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions who grounded his arguments on Article
8(2) of the Tribunal's Statute (ICTR primacy over national courts).'0
Thereafter, Barayagwiza wrote to the Tribunal's Prosecutor complaining
about his detention in Cameroon. On October 15, 1996 the Prosecutor
responded that he was not being held in Cameroon at his behest. Over four
months later, the Cameroonian court rejected Rwanda' s extradition request, and
ordered Barayagwiza's release, but he was immediately re-arrested upon a
request from the OTP. On March 3, 1996, an ICTR judge signed an order,
pursuant to Rule 40 bis (Transfer and Provisional Detention of Suspects), which
required Cameroon to transfer the Accused to the Tribunal's Detention Unit in
Arusha. The Accused was finally shown a copy of the Rule 40 bis order, which
included the general nature of the charges against him, on March 10, 1997,
almost a year after his initial arrest. On September 29, 1997, more than six
months after the March transfer order, and some sixteen months after his initial
arrest, Barayagwiza filed a writ of habeas corpus, which apparently has not
been heard as of the writing of this essay. It is interesting to note that at that
point the OTP still had not submitted an indictment against the Accused for
confirmation. This only took place on October 22, 1997, the day after the
President of Cameroon signed a decree ordering the Accused's transfer to
Arusha. Thus, the Appeals Chamber found that, based on the record, from
March 4 through October 22, 1997 the Tribunal took no action with regard to
the Barayagwiza matter."
When Barayagwiza was finally transferred to Arusha, on November 19,
1997, the Tribunal's winter judicial recess was imminent. Most of the judges
were preparing to leave Arusha and some were not scheduled to return until
8. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 40, available
at http://www.ictr.org, (adopted on July 5, 1995); as amended on January 12, 1996, May 15, 1996, July 4,
1996, June 5, 1997, June 8, 1998, July 1, 1999, February 21, 2000 and June 26, 2000.
9. Richard Goldstone, of South Africa. was the ICTR Prosecutor until October 1996, at which time
Louise Arbor began her tenure.
10. Statute of the International Tribunal, G.A. RES 955, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/955 (1994); G.A. Res.
1165, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/955 (1998).
11. November decision, supra note 5, 144.
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February of the following year. Therefore, in scheduling an initial appearance
-the common law equivalent of an arraignment-for Barayagwiza, the
Tribunal's Registry not only had to address the usual scheduling difficulties of
identifying dates suitable for the OTP and the Defense Counsel, but also may
have faced a shortage of judges. The accused finally made his initial
appearance on February 23, 1998, after spending nineteen months in the
Cameroonian jails, during the bulk of which time he was not formally made
aware of the charges against him, and an additional three months in the
Tribunal's detention facilities, despite the fact that Rule 62 of the RPE required
this proceeding to take place "without undue delay."
The day following his initial appearance, on February 24, 1998, the
Accused filed an Extremely Urgent Motion seeking to nullify his arrest, which
was not heard by the Trial Chamber until September 11, 1998. A decision
dismissing the motion was issued on November 17, 1998- The Accused
appealed the decision some ten days later and the Appeals Chamber, after
receiving additional submissions from the parties, issued an order, on June 3,
1999, directing the Prosecutor to specifically address six questions regarding the
delays, and to provide supporting documentation. 2
The Appeals Chamber then ordered Barayagwiza's release on November
3, 1999, finding that "the combination of delays at virtually every stage of the
Appellant's case"1 3 made the case so egregious that it had no choice but to
dismiss the indictment with prejudice to the Prosecutor as to avoid putting the
Accused through a revolving door of being re-arrested by the Prosecutor. 4 The
Appeals Chamber simultaneously ordered the immediate release of the accused,
while directing the Registrar to make necessary arrangements to deliver
Barayagwiza to the authorities of Cameroon, 5 with one Judge filing a separate
opinion and another appending a declaration to the November decision on this
matter, the relevant substance of which is discussed infra.
The order for a return to Cameroon caused Barayagwiza to file a motion
for review of the modalities of his release.' 6 He complained that there was no
reason for him to be returned to Cameroon, as he had no legal status, family or
business there, nor did he have any means to support himself. 7 That motion
was quickly withdrawn when the Prosecutor asked to be heard on the same
12. Id. 111.
13. Id. 11 09.
14. Id.
15. Id. I 13(4).
16. March decision, supra note 6, 14.
17. The Appeals Chamber should have anticipated this problem and, in fact, Judge Nieto-Navia, in
his separate statement, and Judge Shahabuddeen in his a dissenting opinion, appended to the November
decision, raised this question, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/
Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
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point.' The Prosecutor also filed a motion for review and reconsideration
claiming she had "new facts," which would alter the November decision. 9
Therefore, the Accused remained in the custody of the Tribunal.
The November decision also set into motion a flurry of filings from the
parties and angry and highly publicized protest from not only the Government
of Rwanda, but also from many others in the international community, such as
the European Union,2 Human Rights Watch 2' and a number of academics. The
Rwandans announced that they would suspend cooperation with the Tribunal
and officially condemned the decision at the United Nations. They did allow
the OTP to continue its operations in Kigali, but did not grant the Tribunal's
then new Chief Prosecutor a visa to enter the country for some time.22
Simultaneously, interventions were made by international justice NGOs to mend
relations. They convinced Rwanda to remain engaged with the Tribunal, by
inter alia, filing a request to appear as amicus curiae to address the Tribunal on
the modalities of release, if that question was reached.
By mid-February the Prosecutor produced "new facts" supported, in part,
by a Cameroonian judge's explanations of the politics of the transfer process
from Cameroon to Arusha.' To further prove her case that Barayagwiza was
not simply forgotten, the Prosecutor produced a United States State Department
affidavit to show that attempts to transfer Barayagwiza was an on-going process
for which the OTP had sought outside assistance, in the form of U.S.
intervention.u These claims were all made in an effort to show that the lengthy
delays should not have been attributed to the Prosecutor. The Rwandan amicus
curiae memorial was filed' also by the time the Appeals Chamber heard oral
arguments in Arusha.
On March 31, 2000 the Appeals Chamber ruled that because the new facts
showed that "the violations suffered by the [Accused] and the omissions of the
Prosecutor are not the same as those which emerged from the facts on which the
18. Id.
19. The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, (1999),
available at http: /lwww.ictr.org/ENGLISH/decisions/Barayagwiza/dcs/20000331 .htm.
20. European Parliament resolution on the situation in the Great Lakes Region with special reference
to Rwanda, B5-0276, 0294 and 0300 (1999), available at
http://www3.europari.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/calendar?APP-PV2&LANGUE=EN (last visited May 17,
2001).
21. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Prosecutorial Incompetence Frees Rwandan Suspect (Nov.
10, 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/99/nov/Rwandal 109.htm.
22. Rwanda Agrees to Visit of the United Nations' Chief Prosecutor, Internews Wire Report (1999),
available at http://www.intemetub.orglactivities/ICTR-reports/ICTR News Dec.99.html (last modified Dec.
3, 1999).
23. March decision, supra note 6,1 65(1).
24. Id.1 65(2).
25. March decision, supra note 6, 18.
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[November] Decision is founded,"' the November decision should be
"altered."27 Therefore, it rejected Barayagwiza's application for release, and
decided that for the violations suffered the Accused would be entitled "to a
remedy to be fixed at the time of the judgment at first instance."2
In August 2000, Barayagwiza's case was joined with three others involved
with Rwanda's hate media and allegedly responsible for the genocide,29 one of
whom pled guilty.30 This trial was scheduled to begin on September 18, 2000,
but faced delays yet again, this time as a result of the numerous motions filed
by the defense.3'
Ill. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE NOVEMBER AND MARCH DECISIONS
At the outset, I should note that I do not intend to recount all the factual
findings and legal reasoning behind these decisions, because Professor William
Schabas has published an analysis of the November and March decisions, in
which he examines the issues in dispute and the findings, in sufficient detail.32
So, I will briefly outline the points relevant to my argument that this and future
international criminal tribunals should take due process rights more seriously.
A. The November Decision
In the November decision, the Appeals Chamber found that: 1) the failure
to hear Barayagwiza's writ of habeas corpus and the delay in considering and
deciding his extremely urgent motion; 2) the period of his provisional detention
having been too long-spanning some eighteen months; 3) the failure to promptly
inform the accused of the charges against him; and 4) the protracted wait to
answer charges against him - 96 days after his transfer to Arusha, all combined
amounted to such an egregious breach of his due process rights that the
Prosecutor should no longer have the authority to try him.
33
26. Id. ' 74.
27. Ia
28. Id. 75.
29. In addition to Nahimana and Ngeze, mentioned in the introduction of this essay, the Prosecutor
joined Georges Ruggio, an Italian-Belgian RTLM announcer who resided in Rwanda prior to and during the
1994 genocide.
30. Georges Ruggiu pleaded guilty to incitement to genocide and crimes against humanity and
agreed to testify for the Prosecutor in the media trial. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment in June
2000. Prosecutor v. Ruggio, Case. No. ICTR-97-32-I.
31. Hirondelle Report, Defence Motions Delay Start of Media Trial (2000) (reporting that a number
of motions filed by Nahimana and Barayagwiza would need to be ruled upon before the trial could begin).
32. William A. Schabas, International Decision: Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (Decision, and
Decision (Prosecutor's Requestfor Review or Reconsideration)), ICTR-97-19-AR 72,94 AM. J. INT. L 563,
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (2000) [herinafter Schabus].
33. Decision on the Extremely Urgent Motion by the Defence for Orders to Review and/or Nullify
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At this juncture in the discussion, the outcome of this decision, in terms of
whether the accused should have been tried by the Tribunal, is unimportant.
What is of consequence is that the majority failed to give appropriate weight to
the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed, vis-6-vis the gravity of the due
process violations, since the order was not based on the merits of the case, and
that the majority apparently did not sufficiently consider: 1) the logistical
requirements of his release;34 2) whether the Accused could subsequently be
tried in another jurisdiction; 3) the impact of his release on the reconciliation
process;31 and 4) to a lesser degree, the inevitable fallout with the Government
of Rwanda, without whose cooperation the Tribunal would have to suspend its
operation. Although as the Appeals Chamber noted in the March decision,
Rwanda's non-cooperation would have to be addressed by the United Nations
Security Council, based on Article 28 of the ICTR Statute.
Therefore, the Chamber's decision was inadvisable for the circumstances
of this particular case. That is to say, given the information available to the
Judges at that juncture, the Chamber could have addressed specifically to which
jurisdiction the Accused should be delivered upon his release, so that perhaps
he could be given a fair trial, since the reason for release were procedural.
Alternatively, the Chamber could have found other means by which to sanction
the Prosecutor, and others responsible for the due process violations, and to
allow for compensation should the Accused be found innocent after a trial on
the merits.
B. The March Reversal
In the March decision, which contained a brief four-and-one-half page
analysis of the merits of the Prosecutor's claims, the Appeals Chamber
"altered"36 its November decision. It found the Accused's due process rights
had been violated, however, based on the "new facts" presented by the
Prosecutor, these violations were neither grave, nor were the Prosecutor
omissions offensive. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber decided that:
the Arrest and Provisional Detention of the Suspect, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (Nov 17, 2000).
34. The majority based its decision to return Barayagwiza to the authorities of Cameroon based on
Rule 40 Bis of the RPE which states that the accused "shall be released or, if appropriate, be delivered to the
authorities of the State to which the request was initially made." R.P.E. supra note 8. In the circumstances
of this particular case it was inadvisable to order the return Barayagwiza to Cameroon, as that state is not a
signatory to the 1949 Genocide Convention. As such, he could have evaded justice there because Cameroon
would not have been under an obligation to try him.
35. The United Nations Resolution establishing the ICTR explicitly recognizes reconciliation as a
purpose for the establishment of the Tribunal.
36. Id. 151.
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[F]or the violations of his rights the Appellant is entitled to a remedy,
to be fixed at the time ofjudgment, at first instance, as follows: a) If
the Appellant is found not guilty, he shall receive financial
compensation; b) If the Appellant is found guilty, his sentence shall
be reduced to take into account the violation of this rights."
There are two primary concerns I would like to raise with regard to the
March decision. First, the so-called new facts offered by the Prosecutor did not
meet the two-prong test that a party must satisfy in order to introduce such facts
under the RPE. Second, the remedy offered by the Appeals Chamber is
problematic.
First, with regard to the introduction of new facts, in order to compel the
Chamber to review or reconsider a final decision, a party must show that the
facts were not available to the party at the time of the proceedings "nor would
they have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence"3 and that "if
it had been proven, [the fact] could have been a decisive factor in reaching a
decision. . . ."" In the March decision, the Appeals Chamber remarked, "In the
wholly exceptional circumstances of this case, and in the face of a possible
miscarriage of justice, the Chamber construes the condition laid down in Rule
120 [the first prong of the above mentioned test] as directory in nature."'
Feeling bound by the interest of justice, the Appeals Chamber simply
disregarded the fact that the OTP was aware of the "new facts" in question prior
to filing its response to the Barayagwiza's initial appeal. In fact, the OTP had
even failed to exercise due diligence in providing answers to the questions the
Appeals Chamber judges had raised about the events of the due process
controversy, prior to rendering the November decision. Instead the OTP only
felt obligated to perform its duty diligently after the Appeals Chamber ordered
the release.
In effect, in the March decision, the Appeals Chamber distorted its own
rules in an effort to achieve the desired result, that is, to allow the Prosecutor to
proceed with the case while acknowledging that "the appeal process... is not
designed for the purpose of allowing parties to remedy their own failings or
oversights during trial or sentencing."' The March decision simply claimed
that the ICTR statute does not explicitly address the situation presented and cites
37. Id. 175.
38. ICTR supra note 8, R. 120.
39. ICTR supra note 8, R. 120.
40. March decision, supra note 6,165.
41. Id. 43, citing the Appeals Chamber's findings in The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic. Case
No. IT-96-22, available at http://www.un.orglictylind-e.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
322
Momeni
to clearly distinguishable cases noting that it "does not cite these examples as
authority for its actions in the strict sense." '42
Second, the remedy offered for the violations is no remedy at all. Deciding
that the sentence shall be reduced if the Appellant is found guilty is already
standard procedure. With regard to "compensation if he is found not guilty, 43
it is interesting to note that first, it is unclear what sort of compensation is
contemplated here; and second, nothing in the ICTR Statute or Rules provides
for such measures. Only in October 2000 did the ICTR President send a letter
to the United Nations Secretary General, to be forwarded to the Security
Council, proposing an amendment to the Statute to allow for compensation to
remedy situations of wrongful arrest and/or conviction, violation of rights,
deprivation of liberty and the like."
Furthermore, political considerations apparently also influenced the
alteration of the November decision despite the judges' insistence that the
revision of the decision was in light of the new facts and that political
considerations had no role in their deliberations. The majority's decision, as
well as the separate statements of Judges Vohrah and Nieto-Navia, openly
acknowledge the Rwandan threats of non-cooperation. In fact, the majority
remarked that "the Tribunal is an independent body whose decisions are based
on justice and law. If its decision in any case should be followed by non-
cooperation, that consequence would be a matter for the [UN] Security
Council."'45 To this Professor Schabas has written "Me thinks they insist too
much," 46 although he acknowledged "the volume of new facts sheds a very
different light on the nature of the prosecutorial abuse., 47 The outcome, that
release was not warranted because the nature of the due process violations
Barayagwiza suffered were not as grave and as attributable to the Prosecutor,
is an appropriate one nonetheless.
It is unfortunate that the majority's decision is generally not well reasoned
and lowers certain procedural standards. Furthermore, a number of other
questions remain outstanding in the March decision. For example, it fails to
answer why the habeas petition filed three years ago, which is still before the
Tribunal, is now irrelevant to the violation of due process rights of the Accused
when it was treated previously as an egregious violation. Additionally, the new
facts did not show that the Prosecutor had fulfilled its obligation to timely
inform the Accused of his rights. They simply showed that Barayagwiza knew
42. ld. 169.
43. Id. 175 (3)(b).
44. Hirondefie News Agency, Rwanda Tribunal President Asks for Statute Changes, (Oct 15, 2000),
available at http://www.Hirondelle.orgtsites/Hirondelle.rsf/nefd9rdd48f5826c125 64cf004f793d / 5853206.
45. November Decision, supra note 5.
46. Schabas, supra note 28, at 568.
47. Id.
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the nature of the charges against him in Cameroon in 1996, although not
through the actions of the OTP.
Ultimately, the March decision's conclusion is correct-the procedural
violations suffered by the accused did not outweigh the crimes with which he
is charged. However, in order to deter the Prosecutor from engaging in such
negligent behavior, the Tribunal did have alternatives. It could have released
the Accused into the custody of another jurisdiction where he would have been
give a fair trial, including Rwanda or Belgium, or it could have sanctioned the
prosecution team responsible for this case, through personal fines or reference
to their national bars. Instead the Appeals Chamber rendered a weakly reasoned
decision setting bad precedent.
Ill. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BARAYAGWIZA CONTROVERSY FOR
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE TRIBUNAL?
What procedural delays mean for the credibility of the Tribunals and, by
extension, for furthering the rule of law internationally, is that opponents of
such institutions become armed with examples of why international justice will
not work. This also sets the stage for Barayagwiza and other accused persons
to have an excuse to boycott "unfair" trials, halting the wheels of justice. When
the Tribunal puts itself in situations where it is faced with non-cooperation from
Rwanda, and forces the Appeals Chamber to render decisions with negative
implications for the reconciliation process, it damages not only its own
reputation, but also hampers the pursuit of international justice by extension.
Although it has accomplished more than the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in many ways,4 it is no secret that the ICTR
has had its share of judicial, prosecutorial and administrative troubles.4 Some
of these troubles are attributable to the logistical difficulties-due to a the lack
of infrastructure in Arusha-and others to the exceedingly unclear lines of
responsibility within the Tribunal, which results in a severe lack of
accountability in this 700 plus person bureaucracy. This lack of accountability
has led to insufficient support for the work of the judicial chambers. One of the
violations cited in the November decision was the 96 days that the Accused was
forced to wait to make his initial appearance. This, as the Appeals Chamber
later discovered, was a scheduling problem, which I will discuss below.
48. For example, the ICTR has arrested over 40 persons who presided over the 1994 genocide, both
at a national or regional level. The former Rwandan Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, pled guilty to genocide
in 1998 and was cooperating with the Prosecutor. The ICTY is still struggling to capture many suspects at
the top of its wanted list.
49. The original Registrar and Deputy Prosecutors of the Tribunal were forced to resign due to
serious questions of competence and a lack of efficiency in their respective offices.
In fact, an expert report regarding the problems of support for the work of
Chambers, issued in July 2000, noted that "there is evidence of poor
communication, blurred lines of responsibility, a lack of training at crucial
levels and some tensions in terms of relationships, all of which serve to frustrate
the overriding objective of providing efficient, effective and expeditious support
to the judiciary and Trial Chambers." 5° It is also interesting to note that for the
six years it has been in existence, the ICTR has never had an effective Deputy
Registrar, whose duties include, inter alia, the proper operations of court
management, which includes scheduling hearings. Indeed, the position has been
left unfilled for prolonged periods of time, which points to hiring difficulties.
How was the Barayagwiza case affected by this lack of proper support?
There are two possible problem areas that could be considered here. Fault was
primarily placed with the OTP in the November decision. But the Appeals
Chamber also acknowledged that the Registry, and Chambers contributed to the
delays as well. Furthermore, as mentioned above, in the March decision
Cameroon was also apportioned some responsibility for the delay in the transfer.
The Appeals Chamber was right to note that there were no clean hands in
the matter. The Registry works alongside the OTP on transfers of accused
persons. Obviously, the OTP left Barayagwiza detained in Cameroon for
months before it made a serious attempt to transfer him, while it had transferred
a number of other Rwandans with whom he was detained, and not until after the
Accused had filed a writ of habeas. Therefore, the OTP bears some
responsibility. Perhaps the Registry could have been more insistent with
Cameroon on expediting the transfer, also.
With regard to the delay in scheduling the initial appearance, the
scheduling of the judicial calendar is the responsibility of the Court
Management Section of the Office of the Registrar. However difficult a task it
may be to find common dates on which all parties are available, an organized
and persistent Registry official could ensure that all concerned are consulted for
availability and the final approval is given by the appropriate judges for a
hearing to take place, in a timely manner.
In the Barayagwiza matter, although it may be true that the Defense
Counsel agreed to a February 3rd initial appearance date, one must ask the
question, "why?" When the Accused was transferred in November 1997, the
Judges were about to depart for their winter recess and some were not scheduled
to return until February. Therefore, the long judicial recesses, which the
Registry has had no difficulties in publicizing when it suits its purposes, have
50. Robin Vincent International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: The Court Service for England
and Wales (Jul. 2000) [hereinafter Vincent Report]. On file with the author.
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also been a factor in contributing to the delays and the Barayagwiza case was
no exception.5'
The situation also begs the question why the Registry does not find creative
solutions to address the lingering problems of delays. For example, for the
Barayagwiza initial appearance, if it was just some of the judges who were away
late into February, why did the Registry not suggest that a substitute judge sit
in with the rest of the appropriate chamber to hear the accused plead to the
charges? If counsel was not available, why could the Registry not substitute
temporary local counsel for the proceedings? Perhaps it is again a question of
training and experience.52
The ICTR is in a sense a victim of its own success. The Tribunal's
investigators have located and arrested over 40 of the indicted persons, most of
whom are reputed to have been the true architects of the genocide, either
nationally or within their own regions. Like Barayagwiza, the majority of the
accused have been in detention for three years or more. The pace of trials has
simply not kept up with the pace of arrests. As of the writing of this essay, only
eight persons have been judged by the Tribunal, two of who, had pleaded guilty
and thus avoided protracted and expensive trials. If the Tribunal is to dispense
justice effectively and efficiently, it must avoid situations similar to
Barayagwiza in the future.
IV. AVOIDING FUTURE BARAYAGWIZA SCENARIOS
As a supporter of the Tribunal, there are three basic suggestions that I offer
for preventing persistent and problematic procedural delays. First, structurally,
the organization is set up to fail. There is no single head of the Tribunal, as
there are in most domestic courts.53 For the purposes of this portion of the
discussion, I am referring only to the Judicial Chambers and the Registry, as
obviously, the OTP should be left independent in conducting its operations to
avoid any appearance of impropriety. Although there is a President of the
Tribunal, she is unable to interfere in the administration of the Tribunal. United
Nations officials initially vested this power in the Office of the Registrar, who
is responsible for all administrative, budgetary and recruitment matters. Thus,
there is no ultimate authority and much slips through the proverbial cracks. The
United Nations needs to clarify who is ultimately responsible and reform the
Tribunal's structure so that accountability is maintained and requirements for
51. Although there is at least one judge in Arusha during recess, a suspect must make his initial
appearance before a full chamber.
52. In the last year, serious efforts have been made to ensure that certain staff and even the Judges
participate in various training seminars.
53. In most national courts, the judges have clear authority over the administrative arm of the court.
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administering an effective operation are satisfied. Due process rights cannot be
guaranteed otherwise.
Second, the Tribunal must clarify lines of responsibility not only between
but also within each organ. Moreover, it must either ensure that personnel in all
organs are persons highly experienced in the relevant fields of international
criminal law, court administration and the like, or provide sufficient training for
those who may need it. On this issue the expert report of July 2000 notes that
"[t]here is overwhelming evidence that a number of those working in the
Tribunal either do not understand the real purpose of the Tribunal or, for some
of those who do, do not relate their individual routines and responsibilities to
the achievement of that purpose, directly or indirectly."54 As in most large
bureaucracies, at the Tribunal the buck rarely stops. Until recently, there has
been very little accountability in any of the three organs, although those familiar
with the Tribunal's history will recall that the first Deputy Prosecutor and the
Registrar were asked to resign in 1997.
Recent media reports told of serious disarray in the OTP. In mid-2000
three senior trial attorneys were asked by the Chief Prosecutor to resign
immediately, but "benefiting from the recourses available from the UN system,
it turns out that they will, at worst, simply be distanced from the trials, awaiting
the expiration of their contracts.""5  In addition, another senior attorney
associated with the media trial left the Tribunal for another United Nations post,
just days before the trial was scheduled to begin, reportedly because the OTP
was unprepared to begin the highly publicized trial. In protest, two others on
the same team left the Tribunal. Instances of lack of accountability like these
are not uncommon in other organs of the Tribunal and obviously slow the pace
of the proceedings. When responsibilities are plainly carved out and well
trained, or better yet, experienced personnel are in place, when a Barayagwiza
situation arises again, the problem can be addressed at its source.
Finally, the Tribunal's rules must be clarified and amended to allow
sanctions to be imposed against both the defense and prosecution and the judges
should not hesitate in addressing unprofessional behavior. As it stands, Rule 46
of the RPE, speaks to the issue of misconduct "by counsel" and what the
Chambers are empowered to do against counsel, in such cases. Although, at
last, at plenary session in 2000, the judges agreed that "counsel" in Rule 46
refers to both parties, the implications in the text point primarily to the defense.
A few defense counsel have been referred to their national bars for
misconduct in the past. More recently, the judges have been denying defense
counsel fees for frivolously filed motions. As of the writing of this essay,
54. Vincent report, supra note 49, at 5.
55. A Serious Crisis, UBUTABERA, Editorial, (2000), available at http:Ilwww.
Diplomatiejudiciaire.com.
2001]
328 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:315
however, no Prosecutor has been subjected to Rule 46 sanctions. In order to
ensure that a balance is maintained, especially in cases like the one in question,
the judges should have and indeed exercise the option against both parties.
Should the Tribunal ever face a Barayagwiza situation again, where it is
deemed that releasing the accused is not an option, after making finding of due
process violations and before hearing the merits of the case it should then have
alternatives for addressing the problem. It should be able to impose sanctions
against the individual prosecutor or the prosecuting team for misconduct. For
example, the prosecuting attorney could be held in contempt or monetary fines
could be imposed. The prosecuting attorney could also be referred to his or her
national bar. The efficacy of such an approach may be limited in a United
Nations Tribunal, but the option should still exist. In the Barayagwiza
controversy, it seems that division of responsibility was unclear and one could
say there was negligence on the part of the OTP. But what if a situation arises
where the misconduct is intentional? In this context, the judges have the tools
with which to conduct proper trials with the accused person's due process rights
in tact. They must use these tools even handedly.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal barely saved itself from embarrassment in the Barayagwiza
case. The situation would not have unfolded as it did had the Tribunal's three
organs acted diligently, acknowledging that the due process rights of an accused
were respected. If safeguards and policies exist and are enforced properly, the
Tribunal can better ensure that due process rights are protected.
If the Appeals Chamber had truly desired to take the instant case out of the
Prosecutor's hands it could have arranged that Barayagwiza be transferred to a
jurisdiction where he would face a fair trial. But it chose to keep the case at the
ICTR, using faulty legal reasoning and lowering standards. It also was forced
to negotiate a delicate standoff with the Government of Rwanda, whether it
chooses to acknowledge this fact or not.
To avoid similar future circumstances, the ICTR must reform its structure,
ensure that each section and each organ is clear about its responsibilities and
that accountability is not swept under the rugs of the United Nations
employment/staff rules, and finally hold the Prosecutor to the same standard as
the Defense Counsel.
